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Abstract—This paper presents automatic key generation for
long-range wireless communications in low power wide area
networks (LPWANs), employing LoRa as a case study. Dif-
ferential quantization is adopted to extract a high level of
randomness. Experiments conducted both in an outdoor urban
environment and in an indoor environment demonstrate that this
key generation technique is applicable for LPWANs, and shows
that it is able to reliably generate secure keys.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, low power wide area net-
works, physical layer security, key generation, LoRa/LoRaWAN
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is capable of connecting
people, things, and the environment. This revolution heavily
relies on secure data communications, which are currently
maintained by classic cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
In particular, public key cryptography (PKC) has been the
de facto scheme for distributing keys to the users in modern
communication and computer networks. However, its appli-
cation in the IoT remains a challenge owing to the limited
computational and battery capacity, as well as the requirement
of a public key infrastructure for distributing the public keys.
Key generation from the wireless channel between any pair
of users has become a promising design alternative to comple-
ment PKC. The keys generated can be used for the symmetric
encryption schemes in different layers of the protocol stack,
e.g., the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) for the Wi-Fi MAC
layer encryption or for Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the
transport layer. It is particularly for protecting IoT systems
that contain large numbers of resource-limited devices [1].
A comparison of resource and energy consumption between
the key generation and elliptic curve-based Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) procedure, which is a popular PKC scheme, has been
carried out in [2]. Key generation has been demonstrated to
be more cost-efficient. Explicitly, ECDH consumes 98 times
more energy and imposes 1289 times higher complexity than
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key generation, when both are implemented by an 8-bit Intel
MCS-51 micro-controller [2]. In addition, key generation does
not require any assistance from a third party, which is suitable
for many decentralized or device-to-device IoT applications.
The received signal strength indicator (RSSI) has been the
most popular parameter because of its wide availability in the
transceivers and network interface cards. This has been evi-
denced by its wide applications in Wi-Fi [3]–[6], ZigBee [7],
[8] and Bluetooth [9], etc. However, all these wireless tech-
niques only support operations in short-range environments,
typically within 100 meters. The channel may be deemed
reciprocal in such environments. For example, we carried out
key generation for Wi-Fi in an indoor office scenario [5]. The
RSSI varied from -50 dBm to -25 dBm and random keys were
generated from the reciprocal measurements.
In reality, many IoT applications operate in longer-range
environments, e.g., vehicular communications. There have
been several long range standards designed for low-power
wide area networks (LPWANs), including LoRa, Narrowband
IoT, and Sigfox, etc. A very recent conference contribution
applies key generation with LoRa [10], but the experiments
are carried out in short-range environments, since the received
power only has a 20 dBm variation. In contrast to short-range
wireless communications, the channel conditions in long-range
networks may vary significantly due to the shadowing of
buildings in urban environments.
This paper investigates the key generation in LPWANs with
long range communications, by employing LoRa as a case
study. Our work observed large RSSI variations of the devices,
and used differential quantization to extract the channel’s
randomness. Experiments have been carried out both in an
outdoor urban environment and in an indoor environment. The
system is shown to exhibit beneficial channel reciprocity as
confirmed in terms of cross-correlation and key disagreement
ratio (KDR), and a sufficiently high degree of randomness.
II. OVERVIEW OF LORA/LORAWAN
LoRa is a physical layer modulation technique developed
by Semtech while LoRaWAN is the MAC protocol maintained
by the LoRa Alliance [11]. This section briefly introduces the
relevant background and a detailed introduction can be found
in [12].
A. Physical Layer
LoRa uses chirp spread spectrum (CSS) modulation, which
is immune to multipath and Doppler shift. It is quite robust
2and achieves a receive sensitivity as low as -148 dBm, which is
eminently suitable for long range communications. The main
parameters include bandwidth, spreading factor and code rate,
which can be adjusted according to the specific requirements
of sensitivity, communication range, and data rate.
B. MAC Layer
LoRaWAN relies on a star network topology involving
gateways and end devices. According to the different config-
urations of the receive windows at the end device, there are
three device types, namely Class A, B, and C. The Class A
functionality is mandatory, which is explained in this paper.
The Class A end device can initiate the uplink transmission.
It will then open two receive windows after a certain delay.
In other words, the gateway can only send a downlink frame
to the end device, provided that it receives an uplink frame.
The power consumption of the end device is thus kept very
low. LoRaWAN also defines the so-called confirmed data
message type, which must be acknowledged by the receiver.
The confirmed data message and its ACK message constitute
a pair of bidirectional transmissions, which can be leveraged
for key generation.
C. LoRaWAN Security Mechanism
LoRaWAN has a rigorous security mechanism for pro-
tecting both the application payload and the communication
sessions. The encryption algorithm is based on the one used in
IEEE 802.15.4, which employs advanced encryption standard
(AES) with a key length of 128 bits. LoRaWAN defines
two activation methods, namely activation by personalization
(ABP) and over-the-air activation (OTAA). In the ABP, the
session keys are programmed into the end devices during man-
ufacturing, which cannot be updated. In the OTAA, the session
keys are generated from the device’s root keys, including
AppKey and NwkKey. However, similar to other symmetric
encryption schemes, the distribution technique of the device’s
root keys is not defined in the standard. Inspired by this,
we will propose an innovative key generation scheme by
exploiting the unpredictable features of the wireless channel
between any pair of devices.
III. KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
A full key generation protocol usually includes channel
probing, quantization, information reconciliation, and privacy
amplification [1]. A pair of legitimate users, Alice and Bob,
will carry out channel probing by performing bidirectional
channel measurements. Once sufficient results are collected,
they will separately convert the analog measurements into
binary sequences using a quantizer. Since there may be mis-
match between the keys at Alice and Bob due to noise and
asynchronous sampling, information reconciliation is adopted
for allowing them to agree on the same keys. Finally, privacy
amplification is employed to remove the information leakage.
These four steps will be discussed in detail as follows.
Channel probing harvests the randomness from the wireless
channel. During the ith probe, Alice sends a packet to Bob
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Fig. 1. RSSI of Alice and Bob of experiment carried out within the campus
of University of Liverpool.
who will measure the RSSI XB(i). Upon receiving it, Bob will
reply a message to Alice, who will measure the RSSI XA(i).
Alice and Bob will keep these bidirectional transmissions until
they collect sufficient data. An example of the RSSI of Alice
and Bob collected from an outdoor experiment is shown in
Fig. 1, and the detailed setup will be discussed in Section IV.
It is worth noting that RSSI measurements can be carried
out during regular data transmissions and no dedicated packet
exchange will be required.
Quantization in key generation discretizes the analog mea-
surements into a binary sequence, which works in a similar
manner to the classic analog-to-digital converter (ADC). Abso-
lute value-based quantization is commonly used for comparing
measurements to thresholds and then assigning binary values
to the outcome. For example, the mean value-based quantiza-
tion will assign a 1 to any data above the mean value and a 0 to
any data below the mean value. However, the RSSI output of
Fig. 1 varies from -123 dBm to -49 dBm, which is quite a large
variation. There are many consecutive samples above/below
the mean value. Hence, the mean value-based quantizer will
result in long runs of continuous 1s and 0s, which will not be
random at all. Owing to this impediment, it is not adopted in
this paper. This scheme may be improved by first partitioning
the measurements into smaller blocks and then quantizing each
block separately, as in the adaptive secret bit generation of [3].
However, due to the large variation of RSSI output in LoRa
measurements, it is challenging to determine the block size.
We propose to carry out the quantization based on the
differential value, namely the difference between adjacent
values, as shown in Algorithm 1. The differential quantization
concept was originally proposed in [4]. For each user u,
u = {A,B}, it will carry out the quantization separately.
Whenever a new RSSI, Xu(i+1), is measured, the user u will
compare it to the previous one, Xu(i), and assign Ku(i) as
1/0, when it is larger/smaller than the previous RSSI. The RSSI
measurement may not be very accurate because of using low
cost hardware, hence the RSSI resolution  is introduced. The
RSSI values having variation smaller than  are thus dropped
in order to improve the robustness against the measurement
3Algorithm 1 Differential-based quantization algorithm
INPUT: Xu % RSSI of user u
INPUT:  % RSSI resolution
OUTPUT: Ku % Generated key sequence of user u
1: for i← 1 to N − 1 do
2: if Xu(i+ 1) > Xu(i) +  then
3: Ku(i) = 1
4: else if Xu(i+ 1) < Xu(i)−  then
5: Ku(i) = 0
6: else
7: Xu(i) dropped
8: end if
9: end for
Algorithm 2 Information reconciliation - secure sketch
INPUT: KA, KB % Quantized keys of Alice and Bob
INPUT: C % ECC set shared by Alice and Bob
OUTPUT: KA, KB′ % Reconciled key
1: Alice randomly selects a code c from an ECC set C
2: Alice calculates s = XOR(KA, c)
3: Alice transmits s to Bob through a public channel
4: Bob receives s
5: Bob calculates cB = XOR(KB , s)
6: Bob decodes cB to get c % When dis(c− cB) < t
7: Bob calculates KB′ = XOR(c, s) = KA % Alice
and Bob agree on the same key
imperfection. As each packet has a unique packet sequence
index, the index of the dropped RSSI values is shared between
Alice and Bob, so that they can maintain a common index.
Compared to the absolute value-based quantization, differ-
ential quantization captures the relative changes of the RSSI
values and the channel conditions. This is beneficial because
it produces the key bits based on the comparison between the
adjacent measurements, which does not require any adaptive
adjustment based on the channel conditions. It is therefore
much more lightweight for implementation.
Alice and Bob will respectively produce KA and KB
after quantization. However, as shown in Fig. 1, the channel
measurements XA and XB are not identical, which results
in disagreement between KA and KB . Information reconcil-
iation is thus employed to correct the disagreement. Secure
sketch is one of the popular protocols [13], as shown in
Algorithm 2. It exploits the correction capability of error
correction codes (ECCs) [14], e.g., BCH, LDPC, etc. The ECC
has a maximum error correction capability of t errors. When
the key disagreement, quantified by the Hamming distance,
is lower than t, it can be corrected. Finally, because there
is information exchanged publicly during the information
reconciliation, privacy amplification, e.g., by employing hash
function, is used to remove the information leakage.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Setup
A testbed was built using Arduino Uno and LoRa/GPS
Shield that uses Semtech SX1276 as the LoRa transceiver. The
Fig. 2. The placement of Alice and Bob in the anechoic chamber, University
of Liverpool.
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Fig. 3. RSSI of Alice and Bob of experiment carried out in the anechoic
chamber, University of Liverpool.
RadioHead library [15] is used, which provides the function
to obtain the packet’s RSSI. RSSI has been used extensively
in key generation to represent the link quality, and is also used
in this paper. Two LoRa modules, termed as Alice and Bob,
are configured with the same parameters, including carrier
frequency of 868.1 MHz, bandwidth of 125 kHz, transmission
power of 13 dBm and spreading factor of 7. These two
modules will carry out bidirectional channel measurements,
as introduced in Section III. The RSSI values are transferred
to the PC via a serial port and further processed by Matlab.
Even when there is no channel variation or interference,
the received power may fluctuate because of the imperfect
hardware characteristics. In order to quantify the resolution of
RSSI, we carried out a calibration experiment in an anechoic
chamber at the University of Liverpool. As shown in Fig. 3,
two LoRa devices were placed about two meters apart, which
is a totally static and line-of-sight (LoS) scenario with no
interference from other networks. The experiment ran for
about 15 minutes and collected 4000 packets at each side.
The RSSI of Alice and Bob is shown in Fig. 3. As can be
observed, while there are some spikes in Alice’s RSSI, most of
the RSSI values of Alice and Bob only have a 2 dBm variation.
Therefore, we set  = 2 for the differential quantization.
We then carried out two tests. Alice was placed in an indoor
office of the second floor of the Department of Electrical
Engineering and Electronics building (EEE), University of
Liverpool, the green point in Fig. 4. In the outdoor experiment,
Bob was moving at a walking speed, i.e., about 2 meters
4Fig. 4. The trajectory of Bob in the campus of University of Liverpool.
per second, in the campus of University of Liverpool. Bob
moved from the green point to the red point with the detailed
trajectory shown in Fig. 4. This is a typical urban environment
with many buildings causing severe path loss and shadowing.
The farthest distance between Alice and Bob in the experiment
was about 500 meters. The experiment lasted 21 minutes
and collected about 4000 packets in total. In the second (in-
door) experiment, Bob was moving inside the six-storey EEE
Department building up and down. This is a typical indoor
environment with rich multipath. The indoor experiment lasted
10 minutes and collected about 2300 packets.
B. Results
The RSSI of the outdoor urban and indoor experiments is
shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 5, respectively. Both have very large
variations. We use Pearson’s cross-correlation coefficient and
KDR to characterize the channel reciprocity, and randomness
test to evaluate the quality of the key sequence [1]. Cross-
correlation describes the similarity between any two signals
while KDR measures the ratio of different bits between two
sequences. Randomness of the key determines the security
level because a non-random key will be subject to brute force
attacks.
Pearson’s cross-correlation coefficient is defined as
ρ =
∑N
i=1(XA(i)− µXA)(XB(i)− µXB )√∑N
i=1(XA(i)− µXA)2
√∑N
i=1(XB(i)− µXB )2
,
(1)
where µXu is the mean value of Xu. The KDR is defined as
KDR =
∑lk
i=1 |KA(i)−KB(i)|
lk
, (2)
where lk is the length of the key sequence. The correlation
coefficients in the outdoor and indoor experiments are 0.9582
and 0.9689, respectively. The correlation coefficients are high,
which indicates a high grade of reciprocity. The KDRs in the
outdoor and indoor experiments are 0.0529 and 0.0399, respec-
tively. The KDR is quite low when differential quantization
is used. As we analyzed in our previous work [16], a BCH
(n, k, t) code can correct t/n mismatch, e.g., a BCH (15,3,3)
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TABLE I
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS
Outdoor Indoor
Sequence Length 397 376
Frequency 0.515 0.537
Block frequency 0.905 0.677
Runs 0.023 0.343
Longest run of 1s 0.887 0.331
DFT 0.792 0.85
Serial 0.3, 0.76 0.048, 0.048
Appro. entropy 0.065 0.1
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.538 0.432
Cum. sums (rev) 0.896 0.919
can correct 20% mismatch. The KDR in this paper is thus well
within a classic code’s correction capability.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
randomness test suite is the most popular tool for eval-
uating the randomness of the true/pseudo random number
generator [17]. It has been widely applied in key generation
research and it is also adopted in this paper for evaluating
the randomness of the key sequence generated. Each test will
return a p-value and when this is bigger than a threshold,
e.g., 0.01 in this paper, the sequence passes the test. The
randomness test results of the quantized key sequence is shown
in Table I and the key sequence passes all the tests.
V. KEY GENERATION WITH LORAWAN
We have applied key generation relying on LoRa in the
previous sections. While we can exploit the transmissions
between the LoRaWAN gateway and end devices for key
generation, there are special features and configurations in
LoRaWAN, which require further careful considerations.
The LoRaWAN standard supports up to 16 channels in
total. For example, The Things Network, a global IoT net-
work hosting thousands of LoRaWAN gateways, defines eight
frequencies [18]. In order to decrease the interference, the
end device changes the carrier frequency in a pseudo-random
fashion for every transmission. This pseudo-random frequency
hopping is detrimental to key generation, because the channel
conditions of different frequencies are not reciprocal.
5Fortunately, LoRaWAN also specifies that the downlink
ACK frame should be at the same frequency as that of the
corresponding uplink data frame [11]. The end device first
transmits an uplink confirmed data packet to the gateway.
Upon receiving the data packet, the gateway will respond with
a downlink ACK frame. The carrier frequencies of these two
packets should be the same. Therefore, the key generation
probing process can be carried out using the confirmed uplink
data frame and downlink ACK frame pairs.
VI. DISCUSSION
The keys generated can be used for any cryptographic
schemes, which require a symmetric key. These schemes
do not require a fast key update rate. For example, Wi-Fi
recommends changing the keys, a 128-bit binary sequence,
every hour. In our scheme, each differential comparison will
produce one bit. Hence the key generation rate is less than or
equal to 1 bit per measurement, which should be sufficiently
fast to generate keys at the required rate.
Key generation requires a dynamically fluctuating channel
in order to produce random keys. When users are stationary,
the channel variation is introduced by objects moving in the
environment. Even in a totally static environment, multiple
antennas and frequency diversity can be exploited [19]. How-
ever, in many of the smart city and intelligent transportation
systems, user movements and channel variations are indeed
present as a much needed source of channel randomness.
Key generation is subject to passive eavesdropping [6], [8],
where the eavesdroppers record all the transmissions and try to
crack the system. According to communication theory, when
the eavesdropper is located sufficiently far from the legitimate
users, the eavesdropping channel is uncorrelated with the
legitimate channel. The seminal work in [20], [21] has laid the
information-theoretical foundation for key generation, which
formulates the secret key capacity as
Csk ≥ I(XA;XB)−min[I(XA;XE), I(XB ;XE)], (3)
where XA, XB , and XE are the observations of Alice, Bob,
and Eve, respectively. When Csk > 0, key generation can be
carried out securely. Key generation security under passive
eavesdropping has been validated in [8] through extensive
ZigBee-based experiments. In particular, the work in [10]
demonstrates that legitimate users can still generate keys
securely by using LoRa, when the eavesdropper is located
only 0.15 m or 2 m away.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper applies key generation with the LoRa technology
and investigates automatic key generation performance in a
long-range environment. Because of the large variation of the
channel conditions and RSSI values, we employed differential
quantization to extract the channel’s randomness. We carried
out experiments both in an outdoor urban environment and in
an indoor environment to demonstrate that LoRa-based key
generation has a good performance. Key generation applica-
tion in LoRaWAN was also discussed and was shown to be
feasible by leveraging the uplink confirmed data packet and
downlink ACK packet.
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